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ABSTRACT 
David Evan Gorelick: Integrating raw water transfers into an Eastern U.S. management context: 
a multi-objective analysis 
(Under the direction of Gregory Characklis) 
 
 
In the Eastern U.S. intermittent transfers of treated water are common tool for drought 
management, but untreated “raw” water transfers are rare. Nonetheless, raw water transfers, free 
of physical and financial constraints of treating and piping water, show promise within an 
Eastern regulatory context and could aid in meeting future demands and delaying or avoiding 
expensive infrastructure. This work develops a detailed simulation model to investigate several 
raw water transfer schemes along a common river course, exploring tradeoffs between reliability 
and financial objectives in a multi-utility framework. Applied within the Research Triangle of 
North Carolina, modeling will inform management solutions for an Eastern U.S. region at risk of 
future water shortages. Raw water transfer schemes are observed to substantially improve supply 
reliability and reduce demand management interventions, cut inter-basin transfers by up to 90%, 
and reduce financial risk and long-term debt through decreased dependence on infrastructure and 
increased planning flexibility. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The United States has historically relied on dams, reservoirs and other large infrastructure 
projects to meet demand for water (Gleick, 2003). However, mounting environmental concerns 
and rising costs have made new structural solutions more difficult to implement (Postel et al., 
1996). Reductions in the rate of new supply development (NRC, 2004), perennial population and 
economic growth, and uncertainty in climate and hydrologic patterns (NRC, 2012; GAO, 2014) 
suggest the US faces water scarcity challenges that are likely to be met with fewer infrastructure-
oriented approaches (Gleick and Palaniappan, 2010).   
As a result, water utilities have begun to consider non-structural alternatives to alleviate 
concerns of meeting demand (Lund, 2015). Reducing water use via demand management 
(Renwick and Green, 2000; Moncur, 1987; Baerenklau et al., 2014; Olmstead and Stavins, 2009) 
or supply augmentation via transfers and reallocation (Jenkins et al., 2004; Wilchfort and Lund, 
1997) have become commonplace strategies to combat both long-term shortfalls and drought-
related shortages. Water transfers, specifically, are able to compensate for supply deficits during 
short-term droughts and provide increased diversity in water management options (Kasprzyk et 
al., 2009; NRC, 2004; NRC, 1992).  Transfers of untreated, “raw” water within existing water 
markets, typically from agriculture (low-value) to urban (high-value) activities in the Western 
U.S., have been shown to reduce long-term debt for utilities while maintaining supply reliability 
(Israel and Lund, 1995; Characklis et al., 2006; Vaux and Howitt, 1984). In the Eastern U.S., the 
use of treated water transfers between urban utilities has demonstrated similar ability to maintain 
high supply reliability while lowering costs (Palmer and Characklis, 2009; Zeff et al., 2014).
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Still, transfers of raw water are rarely applied in an Eastern U.S. context (Getches, 1997), 
seemingly owing to uncertainty by water managers over the admissibility of raw water transfers 
under current institutions, reinforced by historical absence of scarcity and the corresponding lack 
of urgency to efficiently manage existing resources. Discrepancies in state laws on water use 
(Klein, 2008), restrictions on municipal impoundment of untreated water (McLawhorn and 
Maddux, 2009), and the lack of a water rights system may all act to limit the ability to purchase, 
lease, or trade raw water. As a result, existing eastern temporary transfer schemes primarily rely 
upon treatment and conveyance infrastructure to ferry treated water, which can be an expensive 
and capacity-limiting endeavor (Caldwell and Characklis, 2014). Furthermore, these schemes are 
often of the inter-basin variety, and transfers of water between watersheds have been sources of 
intense political and legal frustration (Abrams, 1982), with the associated transaction costs 
making them unappealing options for growing communities facing scarcity.  
Nonetheless, existing institutional structures appear not to explicitly prohibit raw water 
transfers. For example, North Carolina law states that any entity making “financial contributions 
to the construction or operation of impoundments” has the right to withdraw any water 
attributable to the impoundment – payment toward dam operation affords a party reasonable 
claim over its waters (NC Gen. Stat. 143-215.44).  Virginia law is more straightforward; the 
owner of a dam has “sole and unrestricted use” of the waters stored behind it (Va Code Ann. 
62.1-115). Within these statutes, so long as natural flows are maintained, raw water transfers 
from an upstream impoundment to a paying downstream user do not seem to run afoul of Eastern 
water law, potentially providing additional resource flexibility to water-stressed regions in the 
East. As well, discussions with regulatory personnel appear to confirm the viability of raw water 
transfers between Eastern users along a common water course (Adkins et al., 2016, personal 
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correspondence). This will be particularly important as population growth stresses existing 
resource management strategies. Better management of raw water within natural watershed 
boundaries can avoid the need for expensive treated water transfers and contentious inter-basin 
imports. 
As it stands, there is a bevy of literature on raw water transfers in the Western U.S., under 
prior appropriation water law, but almost no work in the Eastern states where the riparian rights 
doctrine influences management strategies, meaning the potential benefit of applying Western-
style transfer schemes within other geographic contexts remains largely unexplored. In addition, 
there is little or no evidence of previous work considering the potential for urban-to-urban raw 
water transfers in highly-developed Eastern regions (NRC, 1992); in fact, even studies of 
market-based reallocation have largely centered on transfer of water rights from agriculture to 
urban demands, and studies of risk-based transfer agreements between eastern U.S. urban 
utilities only consider piped quantities of treated water (Palmer and Characklis, 2009; Zeff et al., 
2014; Zeff and Characklis, 2013).  
To that end, this work explores variations of inter-utility raw water transfer schemes 
within an urban environment that appear allowable under existing water management 
institutions. Raw water transfers are modeled using an established risk-based contract structure 
and utility infrastructure finance concepts. Included within a “portfolio” of existing water 
resource management options (Zeff et al., 2014), raw water transfers are evaluated using coupled 
hydrologic and financial models for their ability to satisfy financial and reliability objectives 
simultaneously and act as an alternative to structural expansion within a multi-utility framework.  
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CHAPTER 2: METHODS 
 
 
To reasonably judge the ability of raw water transfers to improve supply reliability and 
reduce long-term utility costs through decreased dependence on structural solutions, there are 
three requirements: a legally feasible raw water transfer agreement structure, an understanding of 
potential environmental and financial ramifications of raw water transfers, and a test case in 
which to evaluate raw water transfers through advanced computational modeling of the system.  
 
2.1 Structuring raw water transfer agreements 
 
For this work, we define a raw water transfer as the exchange of water for supply 
between two parties without the need for conveyance or treatment infrastructure, meaning raw 
water transfers do not require the capital to construct and maintain such systems nor are they 
subject to structural malfunctions and capacity limitations. This implies that transferred water 
must move through natural channels of a single watershed, from an upstream party to a 
downstream one along a river course. Such a geographic alignment influences decision-making 
by both parties; the upstream party may transfer water downstream only when it is comfortable 
with its resultant storage levels. Similarly, a downstream party is likely to request a raw water 
transfer when its own storage levels are low. In this modeling framework, these decision are 
governed by a physical definition of when the risk of future low storage rises to unacceptable 
levels. To do so, this work relies upon risk-based decision-making to regulate raw water transfers 
according to each party’s perceived “risk-of-failure” (Palmer and Characklis, 2009). As 
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described in (1), risk-of-failure (ROF) quantifies a party’s water supply reliability by subjecting 
current storage levels to historically-observed hydrology and demands. 
 
𝑅𝑂𝐹𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦,𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟,𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘 = ∑
𝐹𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟−𝑖
𝑇
𝑇
𝑖=1
                                                                                                            (1) 
 
Risk-of-failure of a given party, for the current week of the current year, is represented as 
a fraction of years in failure over the past 𝑇 years. Each past year y of an ROF calculation 
assumes that initial storage 𝑆𝑦,𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘 is equal to current storage 𝑆𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟,𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘 when applying the 
historical demands and hydrologic events over year y. An annual failure 𝐹𝑦 occurs if at least one 
week over the range w, from the current week in year y to t weeks later, sees storage fall below 
20% of capacity 𝐶𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦 due to the adjusted initial storage (2). For short-term mitigation strategies 
such as transfers or use restrictions, t is equal to 52 weeks. For infrastructure, t is 78 weeks. 
 
𝐹𝑦 = {
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑆𝑦,𝑤 < 0.2𝐶𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑠𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑤 ∈ (𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘,𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘 + 𝑡)
0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒                                                                                
                                                     (2) 
 
Risk-of-failure therefore offers a dynamic tool in decision-making that has been 
developed and applied for a variety of water supply planning options; additional detail on ROF 
calculations is given by Caldwell and Characklis (2014). With respect to this study, a 
downstream party to raw water transfers designates a risk-of-failure level which, if their risk-of-
failure were to rise above it, would trigger an action to request raw water transfers from an 
upstream party. Similarly, an upstream party would only allow a transfer if their current risk-of-
failure levels stood below their own set trigger level (Figure 1). In the event that a raw water 
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transfer takes place, meaning both parties satisfy their risk-of-failure criteria, the downstream 
party would pay for the transferred water on a per-volume basis.  
 
 
 
Figure 1: Example of raw water transfers at weekly intervals over a two-year period between an 
upstream donor (top) and downstream recipient (bottom). Raw water transfers (RWTs) are 
initiated if downstream storage levels fall below the downstream party risk-of-failure tolerance 
trigger (black, bottom) and upstream storage levels are above the upstream party risk-of-failure 
trigger level (black, top).  
 
Should a raw water transfer (RWT) take place, the downstream party will initially request 
the full volume of water necessary to restore their reservoir storage downstream to risk-of-failure 
trigger storage levels (Figure 1; bottom, dotted line). This request, and all subsequent 
calculations, take into account the fraction of RWTs allocated for water supply downstream. This 
fraction, henceforth the allocation ratio, is considered to account for differences in reservoir 
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operation – reservoirs operated by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), for instance, 
may impound or release water to maintain water quality and reduce flood risk as well as for 
water supply, meaning water allocated for supply is only a fraction of reservoir inflows. So, if 
500 million gallons (MG) of water are required to raise supply storage levels and reduce 
downstream risk-of-failure to trigger levels, but only 50% of RWTs are allocated for water 
supply (an allocation ratio of 0.5), then a 1,000 MG RWT is requested. Reservoir releases to 
maintain downstream flow targets – natural flows required under environmental regulations – are 
not counted within RWT calculations. If downstream reservoir levels are below the failure level 
(20% of capacity) in any week, all RWT volume during that week is allocated for downstream 
water supply (allocation ratio of 1.0). 
Once an initial request is made by the upstream party, the request is subject to a number 
of possible curtailments. The upstream party will curtail a request if the total RWT requested 
reduces storage levels sufficiently so as to bring risk-of-failure above the upstream risk-of-failure 
trigger level. In this case, the RWT request is reduced such that lower upstream storage matches 
the risk-of-failure trigger level (Figure 1; top, behavior of dashed line relative to dotted line). A 
request can be further curtailed if it is greater than an agreed-upon maximum allowable weekly 
RWT volume. Releasing water downstream in large quantities may pose a flooding risk and 
adversely affect other riparian owners or wildlife, and an upstream party may find it politically 
untenable to be seen releasing large quantities of water under dry hydrologic conditions. If 
downstream reservoirs are too full to accept the full RWT, it is curtailed accordingly – this 
situation may occur if downstream risk-of-failure for overall storage is high across all 
downstream reservoirs, but only a single reservoir is designated to receive RWTs. Due to 
potential allocation of RWTs for downstream water supply, water quality, and flood storage, 
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once non-supply needs are satisfied in a RWT week, any further RWT water allocated for those 
sectors is diverted for water supply, or alternatively the total request is curtailed after factoring in 
the new temporary allocation ratio of RWT allocation. Because RWTs will temporarily increase 
streamflows between upstream and downstream reservoirs, a cap on the volume of water 
available for release in a single week will also be specified. This cap is sensitive to the historic 
streamflow magnitudes and shifts so as to avoid the potential of flooding.  
The remaining RWT request amount is then finalized, with the agreed-upon amount 
released from upstream supply and added to downstream supply, according to the set 
downstream water supply allocation ratio. The RWT is paid for by the downstream party the 
amount equal to the number of gallons of water transferred multiplied by a fixed price per 
volume of water transferred. The upstream party is then compensated by this amount.  
Raw water transfers may also take place as a result of future infrastructure development. 
Rather than impound and sell water downstream under defined conditions, an upstream user may 
choose to partner with a downstream user to jointly develop storage infrastructure, the capacity 
of which would be shared between parties. Cooperative utility development, shown to help water 
utilities meet individual objectives while decreasing overall development and long-term costs 
(Zeff et al., 2016), would be undertaken if either the upstream or downstream utility expected 
their risk-of-failure to reach unacceptably high levels in the future that could not effectively be 
mitigated through temporary raw water transfers or demand management options.  This ‘long-
term risk-of-failure’ is calculated annually, assuming a party’s reservoirs are full at the beginning 
of the calendar year and that there will be some amount of future demand growth. Each party 
would pay toward construction and operational costs of joint upstream development (JUD) 
proportionately to their desired capacity stake in the project. Storage in the downstream party’s 
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JUD capacity allocation would be available for transfer downstream at any time.  The result of 
this storage arrangement can provide alternate futures of water management for upstream and 
downstream parties (Figure 2).  
 
 
 
Figure 2: Example of potential upstream and downstream differences in storage capacity 
between scenarios with (green) and without (blue) joint upstream infrastructure development. In 
this joint development case, upstream and downstream parties cooperate to expand capacity by 
2025 and again in 2052. 
 
2.2 Study area and modeling framework 
 
To demonstrate the potential impact of raw water transfers within existing Eastern U.S. 
water management practices, transfer schemes are applied to the Research Triangle region of 
North Carolina (Triangle; Figure 3). A rapidly growing urban region with four major water 
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utilities – Raleigh, Durham, Cary, and Orange Water and Sewer Authority (OWASA) – facing 
water scarcity challenges in the near future, the Triangle is a suitable test bed as a reflection of 
the similarly at-risk and densely-populated Eastern U.S. (GAO, 2014). Raleigh, the largest and 
fastest-growing city in the Triangle, is directly downstream from the City of Durham within the 
Neuse River Basin; these cities will act as the upstream (Durham) and downstream (Raleigh) 
parties to raw water transfers originating from Durham’s Lake Michie water supply reservoir and 
moving downstream into Falls Lake, Raleigh’s primary water supply source. Falls Lake, 
operated by USACE, maintains supply, water quality, and flood storage to the degree that only 
42.3% of all inflows are allocated for water supply. This allocation ratio may be adjustable for 
raw water transfers, though this appears unlikely and is not directly addressed in this work. The 
Flat River, which transports water from Lake Michie to Falls Lake, routinely experiences 
streamflows between 100 and 1,000 cubic feet per second (380 - 3,800 MGW) with a mean 
weekly discharge of 919 MGW (USGS gage no. 02085500 at Bahama, NC). For this analysis, 
caps on weekly RWT volume were designated with sensitivity to the past observed record of 
regularly-occurring events along the Flat River so as to avoid flooding via RWTs. In addition, 
because RWTs generally occur during dry hydrologic conditions - when flows into Falls Lake 
are low – including additional streamflow through RWT is unlikely to cause flooding. 
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Figure 3: The Research Triangle region of North Carolina in the eastern United States.  Existing 
treated water infrastructure and potential raw water transfer activities highlighted. 
 
Both utilities currently use risk-of-failure to trigger short-term interventions – water use 
restrictions and treated water transfers from Jordan Lake in the Cape Fear River Basin – as well 
as long-term infrastructure projects. While Durham has the ability to return wastewater effluent 
to the Cape Fear River Basin in substantial quantities, Raleigh does not, meaning any treated 
water transferred to Raleigh from Jordan Lake is considered an inter-basin transfer. 
Previous modeling of the Triangle system (Palmer and Characklis, 2009; Caldwell and 
Characklis, 2014; Zeff et al., 2016) has provided a validated foundation to support the testing of 
raw water transfer schemes. Designed using the C++ programming language, the overall 
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Triangle framework operates at several temporal scales (Figure 4). A model run, or simulation, is 
subject to a fixed set of decision parameters; these include risk-of-failure triggers for water 
transfers, use restrictions, and infrastructure as well as the raw water transfer allocation ratio and 
maximum weekly cap. Each simulation computes 1,000 realizations of the Triangle system from 
2015 to 2060, evaluating utility decision-making and performance under unique, synthetic 
hydrologic “states-of-the-world” (Herman et al., 2013). Doing so allows a determination of the 
robustness of formulations and decision parameters across a wide range of potential future 
hydrologic and water demand scenarios (Kasprzyk et al., 2012; Reed et al., 2013). The synthetic 
hydrologic projections are based on inflows to Triangle reservoirs, generated through a re-
creation of statistical moments and seasonal patterns in the historic record at several streamflow 
gages within the region using an auto-correlated bootstrapping technique (Kirsch et al., 2013).  
Projections of future demand growth are based on utility-provided estimations of annual growth 
and historical records of seasonal trends. Weekly demand is varied using a joint probability 
density function with observed inflow to develop a distribution of possible deviations from the 
weekly mean for each utility, which is then randomly sampled and the value is applied to adjust 
week-to-week demand.  
As simulation results accrue in each week of each realization, they are stored for eventual 
calculation of objective values for the entire simulation. Risk-of-failure for use restrictions and 
water transfers is calculated weekly based on the current storage levels for each utility, while 
long-term infrastructure risk-of-failure is calculated annually and assumes reservoirs begin each 
year at capacity to capture the total drought resilience potential of existing systems. Action to 
expand infrastructure capacity or implement transfers and use restrictions is taken should risk-of-
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failure rise to specified decision trigger levels. For additional detail on risk-of-failure and 
streamflow and demand projections in the Triangle system, see Zeff et al. 2016. 
 
 
Figure 4: Triangle water supply model. Processes detailed based on temporal resolution (left of 
vertical solid line, separated by horizontal dashed lines) and formulation (colors, bottom rows). 
The business-as-usual simulation formulation involves all processes in grey, the raw water 
transfer formulation adds mitigation actions in red, and the joint upstream development 
formulation includes both red and green risk mitigation actions. 
 
Joint, or cooperative, upstream development of infrastructure between the upstream and 
downstream parties to raw water transfers is controlled similarly to other infrastructure options. 
For all infrastructure available for future development (Table 1), long-term risk-of-failure must 
rise above a set trigger level for each utility before the infrastructure option is implemented – for 
cooperative development, infrastructure is triggered when any of the participating utilities’ risk-
of-failure is sufficiently high. Any chosen project will also not be constructed until after its 
permitting period, an amount of time during which it is assumed that a project has not been 
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approved by all involved regulatory bodies, has ended; permitting period lengths were 
determined based on conversations with and reports by regional water utilities. Once a project is 
implemented, it takes 3-5 years to be completed at which point the storage or production of that 
project is added to the participating utilities’ water supply budget. The cost of each option is 
spread over 25 years as debt service payment on bonds with 4% interest rates, parameters which 
are set based on consultation with Triangle water utility officials. For jointly-developed projects 
between two utilities, the fraction of project cost covered by a utility is exactly proportionate to 
that utility’s stake in production or capacity of the infrastructure option. 
 
Table 1: Infrastructure projects available for Triangle utilities across all modeled simulations. 
Infrastructure option Utility Cost 
($MM) 
Storage / 
Production 
Permitting 
period end 
date 
Stone Quarry deep exp. OWASA 64.6 2200 MG 2032 
Lake Michie expansion (low) Durham/Raleigh 158.3 2500 MG 2022 
Lake Michie expansion (high) Durham/Raleigh 203.3 7700 MG 2037 
Little River Reservoir Raleigh 263 3700 MG 2027 
Falls Lake WQ Pool Reallocation Raleigh 68.2 4100 MG 2017 
Neuse River Intake Raleigh 225.5 16 MGD 2017 
Western Jordan WTP (initial) Durham/OWASA 243.3 33 MGD 2022 
Western Jordan WTP (expansion) Durham/OWASA 73.5 54 MGD 2037 
 
Raw water transfer schemes between Durham and Raleigh are evaluated through the 
comparison of three model formulations: (0) business-as-usual (BAU), where each utility acts 
independently of the others to manage its water supply; (1) BAU with raw water transfers 
(Figure 4, red), a formulation allowing Durham to sell impounded water downstream to Raleigh 
from week-to-week; (2) BAU with raw water transfers and joint upstream development (Figure 
4, green), meaning Durham may sell portions of its own Lake Michie capacity to Raleigh and 
that the two utilities concurrently have the ability to partner and jointly expand the Lake Michie 
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reservoir with Raleigh paying for and owning a share of the increased capacity. Each formulation 
will be tested over a number of model simulations, with every simulation having different values 
selected for decision parameters such as risk-of-failure trigger levels, the maximum raw water 
transfer allowed in a given week, and the downstream allocation ratio. 
Consistent through all formulations will be the independent infrastructure projects 
available to each utility, based on regional reports on future water supply planning (Table 1; 
TJCOG, 2014) and past modeling of optimal infrastructure pathways for regional sustainability 
(Zeff et al., 2016).  To emphasize the potential benefits of raw water transfers and joint upstream 
development within the Triangle system, the following infrastructure options are made available: 
OWASA may choose to expand the smallest of its three reservoirs (Stone Quarry), while Raleigh 
may implement up to three primary supply enhancement options (reallocation of the Falls Lake 
water quality pool for water supply storage, construction of an intake to draw water from the 
Neuse River, or creation of a reservoir along Little River) and Durham, not including potential 
joint upstream development in model formulation (2), can opt along with OWASA to access an 
allocation of Jordan Lake by financing a water treatment plant to divert and treat the water and 
distribution mains to transport it to the utility. 
 
2.3 Impacts of raw water transfers 
 
As with other short-term water management options, raw water releases may have 
unintended consequences to both upstream and downstream parties. Though water transfers can 
reduce long-term utility costs, they also subject purchasing utilities to financial risk through 
unpredictable, short-term cost spikes (Zeff and Characklis, 2013) and may leave the seller more 
vulnerable to drought. Consequently, water use restrictions, for example, may be implemented to 
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hedge against low storage levels upstream by temporarily reducing water demands, typically by 
restricting outdoor water usage, in order to maintain supply reliability. Conversely, if a 
downstream party were to request raw water transfers, but was denied, it is likely to seek water 
from another source, perhaps outside its watershed (an inter-basin transfer), potentially raising 
legal and environmental opposition. And, if short-term mitigation options are limited, 
ineffective, or unavailable, a utility may be forced to expand its infrastructure in order to ensure 
reliable supply to cover infrequent and short-lived drought events, increasing their debt burden 
and likely raising water rates for customers. It is essential, therefore, to monitor the impact of 
raw water transfers across a number of objectives for both the upstream and downstream utilities. 
Assessment of raw water transfers based on their ability to satisfy objectives of 
1. reliability 𝑓𝐹 
2. use restriction frequency 𝑓𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑇 
3. peak infrastructure debt burden 𝑓𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇 
4. risk of financial losses 𝑓𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 
5. inter-basin treated water transfer use 𝑓𝑇𝑊𝑇  
will evaluate the merit of raw water transfers in physical, economic, and financial terms, as well 
as illuminate any trade-offs between objectives that may arise as a result.  
Each of the above objective values will represent regional worst-case results; evaluation 
of results in this way captures the benefit of each model formulation without ignoring potential 
tradeoffs between individual actors. For example, from each of 1,000 realizations, reliability is 
calculated for each utility as the percentage of weeks in failure in the year of most weekly 
failures.  The utility with the greatest average worst-year weekly failure rate, or lowest 
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reliability, will represent the region as the objective value 𝑓𝐹 for the entire simulation (3). Each 
objective is mathematically described below: 
The reliability (failure rate) objective is determined for a simulation by maximizing the 
worst-case failure rate among realizations r and utilities U and across years y. 𝐹 is either 0 or 1 
depending on the existence of weekly storage failure in year y as described in (2). As with each 
objective, reliability is calculated separately for each utility U and the worst-performing utility 
represents the objective value (3). 
 
min𝑓𝐹 = max𝑈 [∑
max𝑦(𝐹𝑟,𝑈,𝑦)
𝑛
𝑛
𝑟=1
]                                                                                                        (3) 
 
Restriction use frequency is quantified as the average percentage of weeks under 
restriction by the worst-performing utility in the worst year of each realization of a simulation. 𝑅 
represents the percentage of weeks under restriction in year y for utility U in realization r (4). 
Water utilities are often under political and public pressure to avoid implementing restrictions, 
making reduced restriction frequency a priority. 
 
min 𝑓𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑇 = max𝑈 [∑
max𝑦(𝑅𝑟,𝑈,𝑦)
𝑛
𝑛
𝑟=1
]                                                                                                  (4) 
 
Utilities also consistently hold debt in order to maintain their system infrastructure, and 
the debt burden relative to expected revenues is an important indicator of the financial health of a 
water utility (Leurig, 2010). The worst-case debt for a utility is measured based on the ratio of 
annual debt service payments on bonds 𝐵𝑃 to the utility’s expected annual volumetric revenue 
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𝐴𝑉𝑅. The peak debt objective represents the average worst year debt ratio over all realizations 
(5). Bond payments are subject to the length of bond financing and interest rates for a utility.  
 
min𝑓𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑈
[
 
 
 
∑
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑦 (
𝐵𝑃𝑟,𝑈,𝑦
𝐴𝑉𝑅𝑟,𝑈,𝑦
)
𝑛
𝑛
𝑟=1
]
 
 
 
                                                                                          (5) 
 
The potential for short-term supply shortfall mitigation strategies to destabilize utility 
revenues – use restrictions, for example, temporarily reduce revenues – means that minimizing 
transfers and use restrictions is crucial (Hughes and Leurig, 2013). To measure potential 
financial risk due to revenue losses, the financial losses objective represents the costs of short-
term mitigation 𝑆𝑇𝑀, as a fraction of annual volumetric revenue, not expected to be exceeded in 
99% of years through a simulation (6). Though the financial loss objective calculates value-at-
risk for each utility that results from implementing short-term mitigation actions, this study did 
not include any measures the utility might take to mitigate those financial losses (i.e. reserve 
funds, financial insurance). 
 
min 𝑓𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑈[(𝑆𝑇𝑀𝑟: 𝑃{𝑆𝑇𝑀𝑟 > 𝑆𝑇𝑀} = 0.01)𝑈]                                                                 (6) 
 
Short-term mitigation, for any realization include costs or revenue losses, in the worst 
realization year, due to use restrictions 𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑇𝐶 and both raw 𝑅𝑊𝑇𝐶 and treated 𝑇𝑊𝑇𝐶 water 
transfers (7). 
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𝑆𝑇𝑀𝑟,𝑈 = max𝑦
(max (𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑇𝐶𝑟,𝑈,𝑦 + 𝑇𝑊𝑇𝐶𝑟,𝑈,𝑦 + 𝑅𝑊𝑇𝐶𝑟,𝑈,𝑦, 0)
𝐴𝑉𝑅𝑟,𝑈,𝑦
                                               (7) 
 
For any utility purchasing on treated, inter-basin water transfers, there are both financial 
and political incentives to reduce reliance on this exchange. To quantify use of treated water 
transfers by the downstream party of raw water transfers, the treated water transfers objective 
represents average treated transfers 𝑇𝑊𝑇 to the downstream utility in the worst year of each 
realization over a simulation (8). 
 
min𝑓𝑇𝑊𝑇 = max𝑈 [∑
max𝑦(𝑇𝑊𝑇𝑟,𝑈,𝑦)
𝑛
𝑛
𝑟=1
]                                                                                            (8) 
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CHAPTER 3: RESULTS 
 
 
3.1 Objective performance across formulations 
 
One-hundred and thirty-five model simulations across 3 formulations were run, each with 
a different set of parameter combinations (Table 2) and available infrastructure options. Figure 
5A details the objective performance of each simulation to allow for visual comparison; each 
simulation is represented by a line across all five objectives with the ideal solution being a flat 
line across the bottom of the figure. Objective results for all 405 simulations are averaged by 
formulation in Table 3, Set A. 
While patterns between formulations are difficult to visually discern in the entire 
objective set, trends in results are more apparent when downstream development by Raleigh is 
limited to one infrastructure option (Neuse River Intake) in Figure 5B (Table 3, Set B). These 
simulations are henceforth referred to as “low-development” simulations. In low-development 
simulations on average, formulations with temporary raw water transfers added, but no joint 
upstream development (Figure 5B, red), reduce the regional failure rate objective from 4.5% to 
3.4%, cut use restriction frequency from 43% to 38% of weeks and marginally decrease 
downstream treated transfer use in the worst simulation year relative to the business-as-usual 
(BAU) formulation (Figure 5B, blue) while maintaining the peak debt burden objective. 
However, the financial loss objective, measuring the fraction of AVR at-risk in the worst 1% of 
simulation years, rises from 15.4% to 16.0% due to the introduction of payments by Raleigh to 
Durham for raw water transfers that places Raleigh in a situation of greater financial risk during 
21 
years with many transfer requests. Objective improvements persisted for the joint upstream 
development formulation (Figure 5B, green); relative to BAU, JUD formulations with limited 
downstream development lowered failure rate from 4.5% to 1.7%, worst-year restriction 
frequency from 43% to 18% of weeks, and worst year downstream treated transfer use by 85%. 
Furthermore, peak debt burden decreased from 252% of AVR in the worst year to 238% AVR, 
while financial risk only rose by 0.2% of AVR. It should be noted that neither OWASA nor Cary 
utilities were drivers of the objective results, meaning objective values for either Durham or 
Raleigh – the two parties involved in raw water transfers – were reported as the worst regional 
result in all cases. 
Table 2: Raw water transfer model parameters of relevance 
Parameter Range of 
simulation values 
Risk-of-failure triggers  
    Use restrictions  
        All utilities 10% 
    Treated water transfers  
        Raleigh 2 - 10% 
        Durham 2 - 10% 
        OWASA 2% 
    Raw water transfers  
        Raleigh 4 - 10% 
        Durham 4 - 10% 
    Infrastructure  
        All utilities 5% 
Raw water transfer weekly cap 100 - 5,000 MGW 
Raw water transfer downstream 
water supply allocation ratio 
0.423 - 1.0 
Cost of treated water transfers $3,500/MG 
Cost of raw water transfers $3,500/MG 
Fraction of Lake Michie 
expansion capacity for Durham 
water supply 
0.1 - 1 
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Table 3: Comparison table for subsets of simulation objective results, averaged by formulation 
  Simulation Set Formulation 
Objective (Figure 5 facet) BAU RWT added JUD added 
Failure Rate All (A) 2.9% 2.9% 1.7% 
(worst-year avg. % weeks) Low-development (B) 4.5% 3.4% 1.7% 
  Low-dev. subset (D) 4.5% 3.0% 1.2% 
Use Restrictions All (A) 25% 24% 18% 
(worst-year avg. weeks) Low-development (B) 43% 38% 18% 
  Low-dev. subset (D) 43% 39% 16% 
Peak Debt Burden All (A) 191% 191% 238% 
(worst-year % of AVR) Low-development (B) 252% 252% 238% 
  Low-dev. subset (D) 252% 252% 231% 
Financial Losses All (A) 15.4% 15.4% 15.4% 
(99% VaR, % of AVR) Low-development (B) 15.4% 16.0% 15.6% 
  Low-dev. subset (D) 15.4% 14.6% 15.2% 
Downstream TWTs All (A) 0.054 0.052 0.008 
(worst-year avg. MGD) Low-development (B) 0.054 0.052 0.008 
  Low-dev. subset (D) 0.060 0.059 0.006 
 
One indicator of particular importance to water utilities is their ability to maintain high 
levels of reliability. When considering only simulations from this study that experience failure in 
less than 1.5% of weeks in the worst average year, joint upstream development formulation 
simulations greatly outnumbered, 95 to 4, simulations of the business-as-usual formulation 
(Figure 5C). Though all joint upstream development formulations had greater average worst-year 
peak debt compared to business-as-usual formulations, due to cooperative Lake Michie 
expansion occurring early in the modeled time frame, these formulations also averaged nearly 
ten times fewer worst-year treated water transfers to Raleigh (Figure 5C, right column). The only 
business-as-usual formulations able to sustain this level of reliability developed at least two of 
the three available downstream infrastructure options at Raleigh’s disposal, but many simulations 
of the joint upstream development formulation were able to meet this reliability level with only 
one downstream infrastructure option used. Overall low-development scenarios with joint 
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upstream development can reasonably match the reliability, restriction use, and financial risk 
objective goals of a more developed future under business-as-usual practices.  
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Figure 5: Parallel axis plots of objective performance across business-as-usual (blue), temporary 
raw water transfer (red) and joint upstream development (green) in sets of: (A) all computed 
simulations (B) low-development simulations only (C) all simulations with under 1.5% of worst 
realization years in failure (D) select low-development simulations. Objectives of failure rate (far 
left column), use restriction frequency (first column from left), peak annual infrastructure debt 
(middle column), financial risk (first from right), and treated water transfers to Raleigh (far right 
column) are determined from the worst-case year results over a model simulation. Ideal objective 
performance would be marked by a straight line across the bottom of the plot.  
 
For further analysis, Figure 5B was distilled to three simulations representative of the 
distribution of low-development results in Figure 5D (Table 3, Set D). Each simulation in (D) 
has the same decision parameters and infrastructure options, the only difference being the 
formulation. Improvement across all objectives, by both the RWT and JUD formulations relative 
to BAU, demarcate the possible benefits of raw water transfer use. Though not all simulations 
tested had such clear trends between formulations, this subset of results displays the potential of 
raw water transfer schemes when implemented effectively; both RWT and JUD formulations 
objectively dominate the business-as-usual formulation.  With regard to utility supply reliability, 
raw water transfer and joint infrastructure development formulations improve upon the business-
as-usual formulation (Figure 5D, left column) by reducing failure rate from 4.5% to 3.0% and 
1.2% respectively. Under business-as-usual conditions this high rate of failure would be 
unacceptable; however joint upstream development is able to reduce failures considerably across 
the worst model simulation year. meaning future scenarios with limited regional infrastructure 
development not possible under business-as-usual practices become feasible through raw water 
transfers and joint upstream development. Furthermore, the percent of weeks under restriction in 
the worst average simulation year fell from 43% in the BAU formulation to 16% with JUD, 
constituting an enormous improvement for the regional water utilities, who aim to provide 
reliable service without needing to implement restrictions often and upset their customers. In this 
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low-development simulation subset, both peak debt and financial risk objectives were either 
maintained or improved by RWT and JUD formulations relative to BAU; regional worst-year 
peak debt is reduced by 21% of AVR by the JUD formulation relative to BAU, while both RWT 
and JUD formulations reduce financial risk from the 15.4% AVR levels of the BAU formulation.  
 
3.2 Tradeoffs between upstream and downstream parties 
 
When the objective results of Figure 5D are dis-aggregated to show realization results 
within each simulation, it is evident that notable tradeoffs exist across objective performance 
between upstream (Durham) and downstream (Raleigh) parties to raw water transfers (Figure 6). 
Comparison of model formulations using distributions of restriction frequency and treated water 
transfers for each utility in a simulation, representing the worst year in each of the 1,000 
realizations, demonstrated shifts across objectives. The upstream party to raw water transfers saw 
increases in restriction frequency and treated water transfer volume relative to the business-as-
usual, no raw water transfer formulation, while the downstream party saw a decrease in use 
restriction frequency (Figure 6, differences between red and blue distributions). This is directly 
attributable to the exchange of raw water from Durham to Raleigh; raw water transfers reduce 
storage capacity in upstream reservoirs, more use restrictions are put in place and more treated 
water transfers are requested in response to this increased risk-of-failure. The downstream effects 
are opposite, where lower risk-of-failure levels as a result of increased reservoir inflows from 
raw water transfers mean fewer use restrictions are enacted. Though raw water transfer and joint 
upstream development formulations clearly shift risk from the downstream to the upstream party, 
regional objective performance improves (Figure 5D) relative to business-as-usual. This 
indicates that, though Durham is taking on risk by releasing water to Raleigh and sharing 
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upstream reservoir capacity, Durham (the upstream party) does not suffer objectively while 
providing downstream objective improvement due to more efficient use of available resources. 
 
 
Figure 6: Comparison of model formulations through distributions of treated transfer volume 
(top) and use restriction frequency (bottom) in the worst year of each of 1,000 realizations within 
a single simulation for the upstream (Durham, left) and downstream (Raleigh, right) parties to 
raw water transfers. Raw water transfer formulation results (red) show increased treated water 
transfers to and use restrictions by Durham but fewer use restrictions for Raleigh relative to 
business-as-usual (blue). Formulations also including joint upstream Lake Michie development 
(green) demonstrate increases in Durham and decreases in Raleigh use restriction frequency 
relative to business-as-usual and temporary raw water transfer formulations. Joint upstream 
development resulted in decreased treated water transfer use for both utilities relative to other 
formulations. Distributions of treated water transfers to Raleigh under business-as-usual and raw 
water transfer formulations were nearly identical, hence the appearance of a single, discolored 
distribution. 
 
The ability for Durham and Raleigh to jointly develop additional upstream reservoir 
capacity through expansion of Lake Michie (JUD formulation) illuminated further tradeoffs 
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between utilities. Changes in Figure 6 between joint development (green) and alternative 
formulations show that upstream use restriction frequency in the worst year was greatest with 
joint upstream development relative to either business-as-usual or temporary raw water transfer 
formulations, while the opposite was true for downstream restriction frequency. While this is 
logical for downstream Raleigh – more storage capacity means lower risk-of-failure – Durham 
sees increasing restriction use even with added reservoir capacity. This has two causes: 
differences in Durham’s necessity in the joint development formulation to expand Lake Michie 
should Raleigh come under risk-of-failure as well (in the business-as-usual formulation, Durham 
does not cooperate with Raleigh), and Durham’s capacity stake in Lake Michie expansion. These 
results show Lake Michie, able to expand to either a low or high level, being expanded to a small 
extent before 2025 when joint development is allowed. This means that Durham’s preferred 
independent expansion option, accessing an allocation of Jordan Lake, is pushed into the future 
relative to the business-as-usual scenario. This change in development is further strained 
depending on the size of Durham’s stake in the capacity of an expanded Lake Michie.  For these 
results, Durham purchases only 30% of Lake Michie expansion capacity. The combined push to 
expand Lake Michie by Raleigh, driven by Raleigh’s large future demands, with Durham waiting 
longer to tap a larger, independent supply means Durham must enact more use restrictions to 
deal with worst-case hydrologic conditions. 
 
3.3 Implications for inter-basin transfer 
 
Joint upstream development of Lake Michie, however, drastically reduces treated transfer 
needs for both Durham and Raleigh relative to business-as-usual and temporary raw water 
transfer formulations (Figure 6, top). Durham does not need to rely as heavily on treated 
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transfers from Jordan Lake with additional firm capacity in Lake Michie, and similarly Raleigh 
avoids the need to purchase emergency treated water transfers from Jordan Lake (diverted and 
treated by Cary before being piped through existing interconnections) in worst cases. Joint 
upstream development showed the ability to reduce treated water transfers to Raleigh by at least 
85% on average relative to BAU, and by 90% in the low-development simulation subset (Figure 
5D). 
The resultant impact of this intra-basin cooperation is that Raleigh has reduced its need 
for inter-basin treated water transfers to mitigate dangerously low storage levels. In North 
Carolina, a municipality must apply for the right to transfer water between watersheds if the 
transfer exceeds a one-time limit of 3 MGD or 2 MGD on average. To assess the ability of raw 
water transfers and joint upstream development to remove the need for inter-basin transfers to 
Raleigh, the week of most transfers to Raleigh in every realization was identified for the low-
development subset simulations (Table 3, Set D; Figure 5D). Relative to business-as-usual, 
temporary raw water transfers alone do not reduce inter-basin treated transfers to Raleigh enough 
to fall under the legal threshold (Figure 7). Of the 1,000 realizations in each simulation, 16% 
(157 realizations) of the BAU and 15% (148) of the RWT formulations experienced a week in 
which greater than 21 MG of inter-basin transfers were purchased. This is largely due to 
correlated hydrologic conditions between Raleigh and Durham, meaning that many times 
Durham does not have enough water to allow raw water transfers in the weeks when Raleigh 
storage is low. However, joint upstream development of Lake Michie, allowing Raleigh to 
develop additional capacity, results in enough supply during drought scenarios for Raleigh to 
almost completely avoid the need to purchase inter-basin transfers in almost all future states of 
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the world (Figure 7, green), with only 1% (13) of 1,000 realizations violating the 21 MG worst-
week inter-basin transfer threshold. 
 
 
Figure 7: Comparison of model formulations treated inter-basin transfer in the worst week of 
each of 1,000 realizations within a single simulation for the downstream (Raleigh) party to raw 
water transfers. NC municipalities are required to receive governmental approval for inter-basin 
transfers of over 3 MGD (red line) or 2 MGD (black line) on average. Joint upstream 
development of Lake Michie essentially absolves Raleigh of the need for inter-basin transfers 
above the legal threshold. Distributions of treated water transfers to Raleigh under business-as-
usual and raw water transfer formulations were nearly identical, hence the appearance of a 
single, discolored distribution. 
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CHAPTER 4: DISCUSSION 
 
 
The potential for raw water transfer schemes to improve the flexibility of eastern U.S. 
water management flexibility is not solely limited to the NC Research Triangle. Though this type 
of raw water exchange, to the authors’ knowledge, has not been extensively used outside of the 
Western U.S., we find evidence that it can be applied within existing Eastern institutions, largely 
because many state laws regarding water use are old and purposefully vague. So long as 
upstream impoundments do not reduce downstream river flows so as to deprive riparian users of 
their right to the resource – something that would not occur as a result of increased flows from 
raw water transfers – the financial and reliability benefits afforded by raw water transfers, 
creating an additional supply augmentation strategy while reducing regional infrastructure use, 
appear to demonstrate considerable potential. 
Should raw water transfers schemes be put in place, clearly it will be imperative to also 
understand the objectives and tradeoffs for each party within a region, as well as the full impact 
of any considerations that would factor into an agreement between upstream and downstream 
utilities. For instance, this analysis was able to identify several factors surrounding raw water 
transfers that substantially altered their effectiveness, including the maximum allowable quantity 
of water transferred per week, the fraction of transferred water allocated for downstream water 
supply, and the relative capacity shares of each utility in cooperative upstream development. The 
authors cannot foresee any raw water transfer agreement in which these three aforementioned 
factors are not negotiated; to identify each crucial tradeoff between agreement parameters and 
their implications would require a comprehensive sensitivity analysis. Furthermore, it should be 
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noted that this analysis was not an optimization of decision variables surrounding raw water 
transfers, and the results portrayed demonstrate the potential of raw water transfers and joint 
upstream development to improve regional objectives, but do not fully characterize the Triangle 
system. Future efforts will couple large-scale optimization of raw water transfer decision-making 
with sensitivity analysis of relevant parameters to confidently scope the potential for raw water 
transfers and joint development to positively influence water management. 
A major finding of this work is the potential of raw water transfers to remove the need for 
inter-basin transfers to downstream communities. Inter-basin transfers, in the Triangle (Gargan, 
2017) and elsewhere (Abrams, 1982), often carry significant legal, environmental, and financial 
burdens that act as strong disincentives for building new infrastructure. Relying upon inter-basin 
transfers for water supply can be the path of greatest resistance for water utilities. A primary 
motivation for this work, therefore, was to identify opportunities for more efficient within-basin 
resource management to avoid inter-basin transfer dependence. To that point, raw water transfers 
appear to provide a reasonable alternative. 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
The ability to combine raw water transfer schemes with existing water management 
policy in the eastern U.S. may be valuable for regions with rising populations seeking to meet 
water demands. Reduced reliance upon traditional, structural solutions to limit water supply 
shortfalls through more flexible use of existing capacity and regional cooperation will be 
important in the face of uncertain demand and hydrologic futures. The introduction of raw water 
reallocation schemes, free from the physical and financial constraints of treating and piping 
water, would allow urban centers of the eastern U.S. meet future demands and avoid or delay 
expensive structural alternatives without necessitating difficult institutional change. This work 
proposed and evaluated several variations of inter-utility raw water transfer scheme, involving 
transfers along a common river course, using a regional, multi-utility framework. Application 
within the Research Triangle of North Carolina demonstrated that, relative to business-as-usual 
management strategies, raw water transfers and joint upstream development are in some cases 
able to improve reliability by reducing the rate of supply failure from 4.5% to under 2%, 
avoiding months of water use restrictions in drought years, cutting inter-basin treated water 
transfers by nearly 90%, maintaining or slightly lowering financial risk, and significantly 
decreasing peak and long-term debt burden through decreased dependence on infrastructure and 
increased flexibility in planning options. It can be inferred from these observations that raw 
water transfers have the potential to diversify and improve water supply management strategies, 
and can be generalized to other parts of the Eastern United States within existing state water law. 
34 
REFERENCES 
 
Abrams, R. H. (1982). Interbasin in a Riparian Jurisdiction. Wm. & Mary L. Rev., 24, 591. 
 
Adkins, J., Miller, S., Rouse, R., and Westbrook, V. (2016, May 6). Personal meeting with 
Triangle utility members. 
 
Baerenklau, K. A., Schwabe, K. A., & Dinar, A. (2014). The residential water demand effect of 
increasing block rate water budgets. Land Economics, 90(4), 683-699. 
 
Caldwell, C., & Characklis, G. W. (2014). Impact of contract structure and risk aversion on 
interutility water transfer agreements. Journal of Water Resources Planning and 
Management, 140(1), 100-111. 
 
Characklis, G. W., Kirsch, B. R., Ramsey, J., Dillard, K. E., & Kelley, C. T. (2006). Developing 
portfolios of water supply transfers. Water Resources Research, 42(5). 
 
Gargan, H. (2017, February 7). Judge rules in favor of Fayetteville, against Cary and Apex in 
Jordan Lake water lawsuit. Raleigh News & Observer. 
 
Government Accountability Office (2014). Freshwater: Supply Concerns Continue, and 
Uncertainties Complicate Planning. United States Government, GAO-14-430. 
 
Getches, D. H. (1997). Water law in a nutshell. West Pub. Co. 3. 
 
Gleick, P. H. (2003). Global freshwater resources: soft-path solutions for the 21st century. 
Science, 302(5650), 1524-1528. 
 
Gleick, P. H., & Palaniappan, M. (2010). Peak water limits to freshwater withdrawal and use. 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 107(25), 11155-11162. 
 
Herman, J. D., Reed, P. M., Zeff, H. B., & Characklis, G. W. (2015). How should robustness be 
defined for water systems planning under change?. Journal of Water Resources Planning 
and Management, 141(10), 04015012. 
 
Hughes, J. A., and S. Leurig (2013), Assessing Water System Revenue Risk: Considerations for 
Market Analysts, Ceres, Boston, Mass. 
 
Israel, M., & Lund, J. R. (1995). Recent California water transfers: Implications for water 
management. Nat. Resources J., 35, 1. 
 
Jenkins, M. W., Lund, J. R., Howitt, R. E., Draper, A. J., Msangi, S. M., Tanaka, S. K., ... & 
Marques, G. F. (2004). Optimization of California’s water supply system: results and 
insights. Journal of Water Resources Planning and Management, 130(4), 271-280. 
 
35 
Triangle J Council of Governments (2014). Triangle Regional Water Supply Plan: Volume II: 
Regional Water Supply Alternatives Analysis. TJCOG. 
 
Kasprzyk, J. R., Reed, P. M., Kirsch, B. R., & Characklis, G. W. (2009). Managing population 
and drought risks using many‐objective water portfolio planning under uncertainty. 
Water Resources Research, 45(12). 
 
Kirsch, B. R., Characklis, G. W., & Zeff, H. B. (2012). Evaluating the impact of alternative 
hydro-climate scenarios on transfer agreements: Practical improvement for generating 
synthetic streamflows. Journal of Water Resources Planning and Management, 139(4), 
396-406. 
 
Klein, C. A. (2008). Water Transfers: The Case Against Transbasin Diversions in the Eastern 
States. 25 UCLA J. Envtl. L. & Pol'y 249. 
 
Leurig, S. (2010). The Ripple Effect: Water Risk in the Municipal Bond Market. Ceres, Boston, 
Mass. 
 
Lund, J. R. (2015), Integrating social and physical sciences in water management, Water Resour. 
Res., 51, 5905–5918, doi:10.1002/2015WR017125.  
 
McLawhorn, D. F. and Maddux, J. (2009). Water Ownership by N.C. Local Governments. 
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill School of Government. 
 
Moncur, J. E. (1987). Urban water pricing and drought management. Water Resources Research, 
23(3), 393-398. 
 
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143-215.44 
 
National Research Council (1992). Water Transfers in the West: Efﬁciency, Equity, and the 
Environment. National Academy Press, Washington D.C. 
 
National Research Council (2004). Confronting the Nation’s Water Problems: The Role of 
Research. National Academy Press, Washington D.C. 
 
National Research Council (2012). Challenges and Opportunities in the Hydrologic Sciences. 
National Academy Press, Washington, D.C. 
 
Olmstead, S. M., & Stavins, R. N. (2009). Comparing price and nonprice approaches to urban 
water conservation. Water Resources Research, 45(4). 
 
Palmer, R. N., & Characklis, G. W. (2009). Reducing the costs of meeting regional water 
demand through risk-based transfer agreements. Journal of environmental management, 
90(5), 1703-1714. 
 
36 
Postel, S. L., Daily, G. C., & Ehrlich, P. R. (1996). Human appropriation of renewable fresh 
water. Science, 271(5250), 785. 
 
Reed, P. M., Hadka, D., Herman, J. D., Kasprzyk, J. R., & Kollat, J. B. (2013). Evolutionary 
multiobjective optimization in water resources: The past, present, and future. Advances in 
water resources, 51, 438-456. 
 
Renwick, M. E., & Green, R. D. (2000). Do residential water demand side management policies 
measure up? An analysis of eight California water agencies. Journal of Environmental 
Economics and Management, 40(1), 37-55. 
 
Vaux, H. J., & Howitt, R. E. (1984). Managing water scarcity: an evaluation of interregional 
transfers. Water resources research, 20(7), 785-792. 
 
Va. Code Ann. § 62.1-115 
 
Wilchfort, O., & Lund, J. R. (1997). Shortage management modeling for urban water supply 
systems. Journal of water resources planning and management, 123(4), 250-258. 
 
Zeff, H. B., Kasprzyk, J. R., Herman, J. D., Reed, P. M., & Characklis, G. W. (2014). Navigating 
financial and supply reliability tradeoffs in regional drought management portfolios. 
Water Resources Research, 50(6), 4906-4923. 
 
Zeff, H. B., Herman, J. D., Reed, P. M., & Characklis, G. W. (2016). Cooperative drought 
adaptation: Integrating infrastructure development, conservation, and water transfers into 
adaptive policy pathways. Water Resources Research, 52(9), 7327-7346. 
 
Zeff, H. B., & Characklis, G. W. (2013). Managing water utility financial risks through third‐
party index insurance contracts. Water Resources Research, 49(8), 4939-4951. 
